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Introduction
Rice is both heavily subsidized and rationed in Egypt.

This policy has

significant distributive effects and especially benefits low-income consumers
in both urban and rural areas of the country.

In addition, the policy has

allocative effects in shifting scarce resources to inefficient uses.

This

paper attempts to measure the economic inefficiency associated with this
policy in order that the policy makers may judge better whether or not the
distributive benefits are worth the efficiency costs.
Rice is not only a staple food item to most Egyptian consumers, but it is
one of the most important agricultural crops in the country and thus many
producers are affected by policies that influence the profitability of growing
rice.

Most of the cultivated land area in Egypt is planted to the cereal

crops, and of the cereal total 37 percent is in maize (corn), 29 percent in
wheat, and 22 percent in rice, followed by sorghum and barley.

Approximately

10 percent of the total crop area in the country grows rice.
The northern part of the Nile Delta is the primary rice-growing area, but
rice is consumed throughout Egypt.

Almost all of the crop is produced in the

summer season but consumption occurs throughout the year.

Approximately

98 percent of the total production is consumed as food, with the remainder
used in starch, glucose and soap production.
Governmental policy in the 1950s and 1960s encouraged rice exports.
many years, in value terms, rice ranked next to cotton as an export crop.

For
In

recent years however, exports have declined and by 1980/81, rice had fallen to
fourth place.

In 1981/82, the export target for rice has been reduced to

25,000 tons in accord with the current policy to meet local consumption
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requirements first and to export any surplus that remains (see Table 1).

It

seems clear that unless the policies are changed, Egypt will soon become a
rice importer.

One estimate is that by the year 2000 imports of rice could

reach over 1,000,000 metric tons or about 25 percent of expected consumption
(Arab League).
Since rice is available to consumers at prices below government
procurement costs, its consumption is subsidized and the subsidy is an
important component of the governmental budget.

The retail price of rice is

fixed in absolute terms and because inflation is driving up the prices of most
other commodities, the real price of rice is falling.

The result is a

dramatic increase in consumption (Table 1) and even sometimes the utilization
of rice for "unintended" uses.
Since the subsidy is growing through time, pressures on the government
budget from this source are increasing.

Consequently, the government attempts

to mitigate this burden by keeping the procurement cost relatively low.

This,

in turn, keeps the relative price received by rice farmers lower than those
received for competing crops.

The ultimate effect is to create disincentives

for rice production and cause misallocation of resources.

In other words,

because relative prices are distorted by government policy, Egyptian farmers
receive inefficient market signals and the country produces a different mix of
comnndities than it otherwise would have.

This means that output is produced

at higher real resource costs than would be required if prices were market
determined.
The remainder of the paper is composed of five sections.
describes the marketing and production quota systems for rice.

The first
The next

section discusses patterns of rice consumption in rural and urban areas.

The

third is concerned with pricing and shows how producer prices are influenced

Table 1:

Year

Area
feddan 1

Area Planted, Yield, Produ c tion, Exports, Consumption
and Price Data for Ri ce in Egypt 1965-81

Yield
paddy ton/
feddan 1

Production
in padd;)'. tons 1

Government
quota in
paddy tons 2

Quantity
exported in
milled tons 3

Total
quantity
consumed
in thousand
milled tons 1

Quantity
auto-consumed
and free traded
in eadd;)'. tons

Quantitiy
distributed
locally by
the Government
in milled tons 2

Real farm
price
LE/2addl ton 1

1965

848,088

2.11

1,788,790

835,890

343,821

749

952,900

..

18.1

1966

843,960

I. 99

1,678,634

968,006

386,461

549

710,628

..

21.1

1967

1,074,659

2.12

2,278,932

1,156,033

523,983

835

1,122,899

61,395

23.3

1968

1,204,367

2.15

2,586,237

1,321,781

662,892

875

1,264,456

122,910

24.0

1969

1,139,521

2.24

2,556,765

1,342,080

696,124

972

1,214,685

205,680

23.1

1970

1,142,318

2.28

2,604,675

1,154,058

590,524

l,065

1,450,617

204,736

20.4

1971

1,137,101

2.23

2,533,797

1,068,215

539,662

1,075

1,465,582

260,038

18.5

1972

1,145,553

2.19

2,507,303

1,020,638

46,393

1,226

1,486,665

342,733

18.4

1973

995,302

2.29

2,274,311

925,547

294,528

1,226

1,348,764

425,180

17.4

1974

1,052,987

2.13

2,241,688

866,014

136,116

1,227

1,375,674

439,615

20.1

1975

1,047,471

2.31

2,423,446

1,165,541

104,111

1,243

1,257,905

527,321

20.8

1976

1,078,437

2.13

2,300,032

1,085,943

209,239

1,256

1,214,089

539,740

23.9

1977

1,037,490

2.19

2,272,309

1,053,876

204,243

1,172

1,218,433

557,273

23.9

l 978

1,030,572

2.28

2,350,675

1,107,314

143,853

1,231

1,243,361

567,201

25.l

1979

1,040,094

2.41

2,510,754

1,311,692

94,878

1,324

1,199,062

604,602

105,000

1,318*

1,202,487

598,482

25,000

1,305*

1,078,525

(l)

1980

972,000

2.45

2,384,102

1,181,615
(l)

1981

956,000

2.34

2,236,000

1,157,475

Sources: (1) Ministry of Agriculture (2) Ministry of Supply (3) CAPMAS
Farm prices deflated by the index number of wholesale prices of all commodities (1959/1960 = 100)
*Pre liminary
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by the utilization of a cost-of-production index, and points out theoretical
and empirical difficulties in using this approach.

The fourth section

presents an analysis of retail prices and some of the economic effects of the
consumer subsidy.

The fifth presents a welfare analysis of Egypt's price and

quota policy for rice.

The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the

policy implications and what changes need to be made to reduce the economic
misallocation of resources.
The Marketing and Production-Quota Systems
The Egyptian government has been involved to some degree in marketing
rice since World War II.

Many administrative arrangements and government

agencies have been involved at one time or another--the Ministry of Defense,
the Ministry of Supply, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
the Ministry of Supply supervises the marketing of rice.

Presently,

The government

regulates the marketing system as a part of an integrated policy to meet
consumption, foreign trade, financial and industrial objectives.
From 1944 through 1954 about one-third of the rice production of the
country was marketed through government institutions.
two-thirds was marketed privately in free markets.

The remaining

Much of this private

marketing, however, was supervised by the government, which assigned each
wholesaler a share of the market according to his past average sales and the
size of the distribution area.

Also, quotas of milled rice were assigned by

the government to specified retailers who received deliveries from the
wholesalers.
In 1954, government cooperatives became involved in marketing of rice.
These agencies are not cooperatives in the British or American tradition but
are local stations of the national ministries.

At first, marketing through
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the cooperatives was not mandatory.

After the nationalization of the

country's principal industries in 1962, however, the General Egyptian
Association for Milling Rice and Wheat and Bakeries in the Ministry of Supply
supervised the marketing of rice with the aid of the Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Association in the Ministry of Agriculture.

(Now these agencies

are called the Rice Marketing Company and the Agricultural Credit and
Development Bank, respectively).
In 1962/63 it became obligatory for farmers to market their rice at the
cooperatives in seven of the primary-producing rice governorates. 1

Later the

mandate to market through the cooperatives was extended to the other
governorates as well. 2

This made it possible for all of the other

governmental rice marketing institutions to be abolished.

The government did

not require the marketing of the entire rice crop, however, and it was assumed
that rice produced, but not marketed, would be consumed at home by the rice
farmer and his family.

What has occurred in actuality, however, is that much

of the production not delivered to the cooperatives is traded in an
unregulated market on a freely competitive basis.

The reasons that this

market arose are not difficult to find and are tied up in the complex web of
fixed prices, rationing, and production quotas that will be discussed more
fully later on in the paper.
The Development and Administration of the Quota
From 1944 until 1964 the obligatory quota which every rice producer sold
to the government cooperative was determined by the area planted to rice on
the farm.

Farmers planting over two feddans (one feddan equals 1.038 acres)

of rice were required to sell between one-fourth and three-fourths dariba3
(0.24-0.71 metric tons) per feddan, with those planting more required to
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deliver more per feddan.

Farmers who planted less than two feddans of rice

were allowed to keep all of their rice production.
Over the period 1965 to 1970 the quota was increased but still varied
depending on the area planted to rice by each farmer.

In addition, the quota

differed according to land productivity, from about 1.17 to 1.65 metric tons
per feddan.

Not only was the quota raised from its 1964 level, but farmers

growing less than two feddans of rice were also obligated to deliver an
assigned portion of their production to the cooperative.
In 1970, the policy was changed again, and quotas depended on land
productivity only.

This policy remains in effect today.

Recently, quantities

of rice which are delivered to the Ministry of Agriculture to be used as seed
may be deducted from the government quota.

Another feature which has been

added in recent years is that rice producers who choose to deliver more than
their quota to the government cooperatives have received a slightly higher
price on the quantity above the quota as the Rice Marketing Company pays the
farmer's share of the marketing costs.
Since the price paid to farmers for quota is less than the price in the
open market (to be discussed later), the effect of basing the quota on land
productivity is to create disincentives for investing in
productivity-enhancing technology and management practices.

This may be one

reason why yield increases (Table 1) have been lagging behind those in other
countries.
In the period of the 1960s and the 1970s from 39 to 58 percent of the
annual total production of rice has been delivered to the government.
Table 1.)

(See

The average quota was set at 1.5 tons of paddy rice per feddan, but

only about 1.3 tons per feddan is the average delivered amount.

Either

enforcement of the quota has been lax, or the farmers choose to pay the fines
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associated with nondelivery.

The potential for political favortism and the

corrupting of enforcement officials is very great in a situation of this kind.
Resources that are utilized to escape the quota could have been utilized in
other productive pursuits and thus can be said to be misallocated.

At the

same time, these actions serve to enhance producer incomes and increase the
supply of rice going to the open market where it probably has higher value
than the average value of all uses if taken by the government (see Figure 1).
Marketing Channels
Rice is distributed to consumers in two markets.

One of them is

completely controlled by the government whereas the other is free but
technically illegal.

It appears that each market handles about half of the

production of paddy rice.
Farmers are supposed to submit their assigned quotas to assembly centers
supervised either by the cooperatives described above or by the village banks.
It then becomes the property of the Rice Marketing Company, and the unmilled
paddy rice is processed in modern mills owned by the Company.

The milled rice

is then distributed through government as well as private retail stores for
local consumption.

Part of this rice is available only through a ration book

and is sold at a "low" fixed price.

Rice is also sold unrationed, and at a

higher price, but sometimes supplies are not available.
of pricing is presented later.)

(Further discussion

Milled rice is also distributed by the

Company to public sector export companies which then send it abroad.
By contrast, rice which is not delivered under the quota is mostly milled
in semi-electric, primitive mills belonging to the private sector.

Generally,

this rice is of somewhat lower quality and is available to rice producers for
their own consumption as well as for trade in the open market.

Even though it
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is of lower quality, the price of rice in the free market tends to be higher
than that which is rationed.

Thus, rural consumers obtain rice either by

producing it directly, by using ration books to purchase rice from private
stores, or via the open market.
Figure 1 presents a schematic diagram of the distribution system for rice
in Egypt.
Consumption of Rice
Based on the Family Budget Survey of 1964/65 it was estimated that per
capita consumption of milled rice in the urban sector varied among
governorates from 10 to 50 kilograms per year while the variation was 10 to
101 kilos in rural areas.

These large differences in quantity consumed seem

to be due to different tastes and preferences for rice and to highly disparate
availabilities of rice among governorates.

The high boundary in both sectors

represents consumers in the rice-producing belt of Lower Egypt, while the low
boundary represents new consumers of rice in Upper Egypt, where lentils,
pre-matured wheat (freek) and millet were also consumed in large quantities.
The estimated per capita consumption of rice based on the 1974/75 Family
Budget Survey, varied between 16 and 33 kilograms annually in urban areas, and
between 14 and 61 kilograms in rural areas.

Lower boundaries were higher in

both areas than in 1964/65, but upper boundaries were lower resulting in a
reduction in the range.

The reason probably is the more effective rationing

and distribution system in place in the latter period.
A Chow test was employed to test statistically the significance of the
rural-urban differences in the regression coefficients in Engel curves for
rice, based on data from the Family Budget Survey in 1974/75.

It was found

that calculated F statistics were 53.82, 59.05, and 101.69 for the linear,
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double log, and semi-log equations respectively.

All are significant at the

1 percent probability level.
The quantity of rice distributed to consumers through the ration books
differs from one governorate to another according to historical consumption
patterns and whether or not the crop is produced in the governorate.

The

rationed quantity also differs from one month to another according to the rice
marketing season, the fasting month (Ramadan), and summer vacations.

The

yearly per capita quantity of rice per consumer registered for the ration book
in 1980 ranged between 4 and 44 kilograms of milled rice among governorates.
The largest amounts were allocated to those governorates bordering on the
Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal, while the smallest amounts were given to
the rice-producing and Upper Egypt governorates.
11.2 kilos per person per year.

The average amount was

The number of persons registered for the

ration books in 1980 were 18,604,021 in urban areas and 19,209,811 in rural
areas.
Let us now consider the last year for which data are available and try to
establish the distribution of rice consumption.

The 1980/81 average monthly

quantity distributed to registered consumers via the ration books was about
27,310 tons or about 327,720 tons of milled rice per year.

The better quality

rice sold at a higher price amounted to 278,580 tons in 1980/81.

About

81,000 tons of this rice (29.1 percent) were assigned to the Cairo
Metropolitan area.
armed forces.

In addition, about 30 thousand tons were allocated to the

In 1981/82, it is anticipated that 408,000 tons of milled rice

will be distributed to consumers via the ration books and about 276,000 tons
of the better quality will be made available for purchase.
will be kept as a reserve stock.

About 75,000 tons
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The official estimate of procurement obtained through the quota on
producers in 1981 was about 1,157,475 tons of paddy rice or about 736,307 tons
of milled rice.

(The extraction rate applicable was one ton of milled rice

for every 1.572 tons of paddy rice.)
estimated total production.

This represents 51.8 percent of the

About 25,000 tons of milled rice will be

available for export in 1981/82 and the rest will be consumed locally. Looked
at another way, 54.5 percent of the total quantity consumed either as food or
processed will be marketed and distributed locally by the government with the
remainder left in the hands of the rice producers to be consumed at home or
freely traded in the open market.

One estimate of the quantity of home

consumption is based on data from the Farm Management Survey in 1976/77.
About 70 percent of the rice remaining with farmers after the quota was met
was consumed by them and their families and the rest became the marketable
surplus in the free market (see Goueli).

It is expected, however, that

greater quantities of rice have gone to the open market in recent years
because prices have been attractive there. The government increased the
quantity distributed through the government shops in the rural areas at
subsidizd prices, and this rice displaced home consumption of rice left in
farmer hands which then was sold in the open market.
In urban areas, one way of estimating quantities consumed in 1980/81 is
by taking the government quota (1,181,615 tons of paddy) and subtracting the
quantities going to other outlets:

165,060 tons exported, 36,942 tons

manufactured, 11,816 tons wasted, 4 and 338,216 tons of paddy rationed to the
rural areas.

The remainder is 629,581 tons (or 400,496 tons milled); i.e.,

33.8 k.g. of paddy rice per registered person or about 21.5 k.g. of milled
rice per year.
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An alternative way of estimating urban consumption is to take the
quantity distributed through the ration books in 1980/81 (208,365 tons of
milled rice) and add the quantity sold unrationed at the set price of
14 piasters per kilo (175,766 tons of milled rice), since most of this rice
goes to urban consumers.

The total is approximately the same result

(384,131 tons milled) after subtracting out the waste.
In rural areas, the consumption of rice in 1980/81 can be estimated by
subtracting the quota from the total production of 2,384,102 tons of paddy,
accounting for waste of 1 percent, for seeds 5 (62,0000 tons) and adding back
in the part of the quota that is rationed to rural residents (338,216 tons
paddy).

These figures will sum up to about 1,466,679 tons of paddy

(933,002 tons of milled rice) i.e., 48.6 k.g. of milled rice per registered
person per year.
The Pricing of Rice
Farm Prices
It is known that cultivation of rice in Egypt depends on the availability
and application of irrigation water.
permits to plant rice.

The Ministry of Irrigation issues annual

The acreage in rice is also affected by land

reclamation policy, the profitability of growing competitive summer crops
(such as cotton and maize), a comparison of the net revenue of a wheat and
rice rotation, a cotton-rice rotation, and costs of production.
The Egyptian Government fixes the farm prices of many agricultural
products, generally those which are marketed through the cooperatives.
Designated committees representing several ministries decide what the prices
will be and declare them before the crops are planted.

13

The price committee for rice has representatives from the Ministries of
Supply, Agriculture and Economics.

It sets the farm price by relying mainly

on the cost of production for that crop, although budgetary, foreign exchange,
financial, equity, and even health factors also help determine the final
decision.

In addition, the profitability of growing other crops in the

rotation is also considered in setting the price.
The farm price of the quota for paddy rice was L.E. 75 per ton6 in 1980,
L.E. 85 per ton in 1981, and it may increase to L.E. 100 in 1982.

The

increases in the farm price are due primarily to the increase in agricultural
wage rates and the prices of some other inputs which have increased the
cost-of-production index.

The farm price of quota rice varies according to

grades and varieties, but it does not vary among governorates unless the costs
of production are different among them.
Using a cost-of-production criterion for fixing prices received by
farmers for agricultural commodities has attractive features on equity
grounds, but is likely to be quite inefficient in the allocation of resources.
The rotation-profitability indicator referred to above is also essentially an
equity criterion that may be even more inefficient than cost of production if
prices are reduced if profitability is high.

Let us see why setting prices by

cost-of-production and profitability criteria creates such devastating
consequences for economic efficiency, especially in the long run.
A theoretical problem arises in defining cost of production.

To guide

his production decisions, the farmer uses the concept of opportunity cost;
i.e., the value of the resources available to him in their best alternative
use.
corn.

If he plants his land to rice, he cannot at the same time plant it to
The cost of land in producing rice is the foregone returns to land from
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producing corn.

But since it is rice and not corn which is actually produced,

opportunity cost is hypothetical and subjective and no one except the farmer
himself can know what it is.

Therefore, any attempt to objectively measure

opportunity costs may be quite inaccurate, particularly for those resources
owned by the farmer himself:

his labor time and management, land, energy

source, machinery and tools, etc.
value in his production options.

Only the farmer can accurately assess their
The common practice of treating these

farmer-owned resources as if they were market-purchased and valued at market
prices may be far off the mark.
The resource, land, is especially troublesome in valuation for
determining cost-of-production.

In Egypt, the land rent is fixed at seven

times the land tax, and as such is determined completely outside the land
market.

Rent is thus related in no obvious way to land productivity and

opportunity cost.

It does, of course, affect the "economic rents" captured by

the farm operator and the farm owner and indirectly will influence the price
of land.
A second problem is:

Whose cost of production is being estimated and

represented by a given index number?

In the usual real world situation, costs

of production vary significantly among farmers even within a given production
area.
others.

An average will understate costs for some and overstate them for

If the price is set at the average cost of production, presumably

some farmers will earn profits and some will incur losses.

Because those

incurring losses will complain that the price is too low, there will be
pressure on the committee to raise prices so that a larger fraction of the
producers will have their costs covered.

This practice will encourage

inefficiency by weakening competitive pressures on those who produce
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at higher costs.

Perhaps most objectionable, the pricing policy tends to

become politicized and is influenced more by the political power of commodity
groups than by comparative costs.
This point has grave consequences for economic efficiency since setting
prices on a cost-of-production basis prevents comparative advantage from
guiding resource allocation in the economy.

It is well-known that one of the

rules for efficient allocation is that price equal marginal opportunity cost.
For illustration, consider two crops that could be traded
internationally, A and B.
is L.E. 20 per unit.

Let us suppose that the world market price for each

Further, suppose that marginal opportunity cost were

correctly estimated at L.E. 15 for A and L.E. 10 for B.

Clearly, B has

comparative advantage for profitable production and should be encouraged.

The

policy of setting the domestic price at the cost of production, however, would
price A higher than Band thus would encourage production of the less
efficient crop.

This deprives the economy of the large economic gains that

could be captured in the production of B.

The ultimate result is a lower

standard of living for the nation as a whole.
An efficient pricing policy must consider both costs from the supply side
and valuations of the commodity (i.e., the world price) from the demand side.
An objection to the above reasoning may be raised to the effect that
equity is more important than efficiency, and especially to the public
decision makers who must operate in the political arena.

Therefore, since

pricing at cost of production seems to be equitable, the country should be
willing to bear some efficiency costs associated with an equitable policy.
The answer to this objection is that efficiency may not need to be sacrified
in order to achieve equity.

An efficient economy is one of maximum value
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output; i.e., there is more value output to distribute than if the economy is
inefficient.

There may be other ways to redistribute income than by fixing

prices at cost of production; e.g., income grants, public services, input
subsidies, etc., although it must be admitted that there are efficiency
implications associated with some of these practices as well.
Quite apart from these somewhat theoretical objections to
cost-of-production pricing, is a continuous complaint from producers that the
cost of production declared by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) understates
their true costs (Aly and El Gabaly).

The cost of production estimated by the

MOA per feddan of summer rice was about L.E. 162.54 and L.E. 197 in 1980 and
1981, respectively.

The Rice Producer's Cooperative, on the other hand,

estimated the total cost of production per feddan at about L.E. 217 in 1980.
This is not to argue that the producers' estimates are "factual."

It would

seem to be in their interest to overstate costs if doing so would strengthen
their arguments for higher prices.

Also, there is an allegation by producers

that the Agricultural Credit and Development Bank (village banks)
overestimates the cost of marketing which the committee deducts from the total
price to arrive at the price received by farmers.
By comparison with quota prices of L.E. 75 in 1980 and L.E. 85 in 1981
the net price received by farmers for quantities of paddy rice sold in the
free market was about L.E. 90-110 per ton in 1980/81 and it is currently about
L.E. 150 in 1981/82.

At the average yields reported in Table 1, the per

feddan revenues in 1980 for quota rice would have been about 184 L.E. in 1980
and 199 L.E. in 1981.
197 L.E., respectively.

These compare to MOA per feddan costs of 163 and
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Rice Consumer Subsidies
There are three retail prices of milled rice; two are controlled by the
government and one is established in the free market.

The ration book price

is presently fixed at 5.00 p.t. 7 per kilogram (4.6 p.t. to retailers).

The

quality of this rice is almost uniformly low and it is sold unpacked in
assigned private retail shops.

Additional quantities of rice, packed in bags

of 5 kilograms, are sold at 14 p.t. per kilogram (12.00 p.t. to retailers).
This rice is sold in both government and private retail shops.
introduced in the market in 1975/76.

It was first

It was priced initially at 15 p.t.,

later at 18 p.t. but recently has been fixed at 14 p.t.

It appears that the

price covered the production, processing, and other marketing costs until
1978/79, but since that time even this rice has been subsidized.
The free market for rice exists primarily in the rural areas, and the
free retail price varied during the marketing season between 15 and 25 p.t.
per kilogram in 1980/81.

As in any other open market the price is influenced

by competitive forces of supply and demand.

But since this market is

technically illegal, it is expected that there is some risk in selling the
commodity.

This implies that the price paid by consumers is higher than would

be the case if the market were legal and therefore represents the upper
boundary of what would be a competitive seller price.

If there is also risk

to the consumer, the price which is paid might be less than the marginal
valuation of rice and therefore, represents the lower boundary of a consumer
offer price.
If the processing and marketing costs are added to the free farrn:--gate
price of paddy, it appears that the sum on average is quite close to the
export border price FOB, which is about L.E. 150 per ton (15 p.t. per k.g.).
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Of course, the opportunity cost to the economy of domestic consumption is the
value of foregone exports.
Rice is sold to Egyptian consumers, however, at prices below government
procurement costs.

Because rice is sold at two different levels of retail

prices in the controlled market for rice, its subsidy differs.

Figures from

the Ministry of Supply indicate that the direct subsidy to rice consumers was
about L.E. 44 million in 1980/81, and is expected to reach L.E. 63 million in
1981/82.
To calculate the subsidy per ton in 1980/81, let us begin with the price
paid to producers of L.E. 75/ton.

Let us add the total marketing and milling

costs claimed to have been paid by the Company of L.E. 27.603 per ton and
subtract the total value of by-products of L.E. 8.773 per ton.
net costs per paddy ton of L.E. 93.83.

The result is

Assume the conversion rate is

1.572 tons of paddy per ton of milled rice.

The company is allowed a profit

of 5 percent of net costs of paddy rice (L.E. 7.38).

Consequently, the total

costs of procurement, milling, and distributing rice to the retailers is
L.E. 154.88.

Thus, the subsidy per ton of milled rice is about L.E. 105 for

rationed rice sold at 5 p.t. per kilo, and about L.E. 15 for unrationed rice
sold at 14 p.t. per kilo.
Since 1976/77 another yet higher quality rice has been available in the
market and is sold to large restaurant and hotels at a price of L.E. 400-500
per ton.

The quantity was modest early in the period as expected (about

2,000 tons), but reached about 153 thousand tons in 1979/80.

Of course, these

sales are not subsidized and yield profits for the Company.
As was mentioned earlier, Egypt continues to export some rice, although
quantities are declining rapidly.

Egypt exports different grades that vary
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between 3 and 40 percent broken kernels.

Also, it exports enriched grades

containing only 3 to 6 percent of broken kernels.
costs vary between L.E. 2.39 and 5.15 per ton.

The additional enrichment

The Ministry of Supply

estimates the total export costs vary between L.E. 141.84 and 170.32 per ton.
The government also exports husked rice (unmilled) at a cost of L.E. 138.48 to
137.41 per ton.

The exported rice is usually packed in sacks at costs of

about L.E. 6.939 per ton if it is packed in two sacks (one old and one new).
Other costs are transportation to the port, averaged at L.E. 2.174 to Port
Said and 5.400 to Alexandria.

In addition, there may be minor costs connected

with the customs.
Let us turn next to the revenue side of the export market.

In 1980/81,

the total value of rice exports was L.E. 20.3 million8 after subtracting the
banking costs, the exporting company commission (3 percent of the total export
value), export costs, and costs in the customs area.
Net export value covered about half of the subsidy in 1980/81.

Part of

the revenues go to the general government budget in the form of export taxes.
Another part covers the salaries of government employees working in
institutions involved in the marketing and milling of rice.

These latter

outlays are about L.E. 36.18 per ton and represent about one-fourth of the
actual (unsubsidized retail price).
Of course, the Ministry of Supply requests the budgetary support to cover
its losses from supplying rationed rice at the low subsidized prices.

To the

Ministry the relevant subsidy is the difference between its costs and the
revenues collected from subsidized consumers.
From the viewpoint of the economy as a whole and efficient resource
allocation, however, subsidies and exports may be looked at differently.
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Suppose the world market price were 25 p.t. per k.g. of milled rice at Egypt's
border.

Thus, the real opportunity cost to the Egyptian economy of domestic

consumption of rice would be this border price.

Egypt foregoes foreign

exchange earnings of 25 p.t. per k.g. if the rice were consumed by Egyptians.
Therefore, from the viewpoint of the economy as a whole the subsidy resulting
from the price policy would be 20 p.t. to the consumers of rationed rice
(25 p.t. border price minus 5 p.t. ration book price) and 11 p.t. for
nonrationed purchases by domestic consumer (25 p.t. border price minus 14 p.t.
price to consumers).

This reasoning is valid only if the border price

exceeded the value of real resources expended by the exporting agency in
acquiring rice and supplying it to foreign buyers.

Of course, in reality the

border price fluctuates sharply as it follows world price movements.
A Welfare Analysis of Egypt's Price and Quota Policy for Rice
The implications for efficient allocation of resources of the subsidy and
rationing policies for rice will be explored in a demand-supply framework.
Figure 2 is a schematic representation of the market for rice where Du
represents the demand for rice in urban areas and Dr the demand in rural
areas.

Dt is the horizontal summation of these demands and represents the

marginal valuation for alternative quantities of rice consumed in the domestic
economy as a whole.
The price elasticity of total demand for rice at the retail level in
Egypt has been estimated to be between -0.31 to -0.59
and Scandizzo).

(Bale and Lutz; Lutz

Estimates of income elasticity have varied between 0.96 and

1.03, making rice a superior good (Badawi).
St is the domestic supply curve for rice and represents the marginal
opportunity costs for the factors of production utilized in the production of
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rice in Egypt.

Estimates of the supply elasticity for rice at the farm gate

have varied between 0.10 and 0.44 in the short run and between 0.44 and 0.52
over the long-run (see, e.g., Sarris and El Amir; Bale and Lutz; Lutz and
Scandizzo; Abdel Rehim; Food and Agriculture Organization; and Nabila).
Let Pw represent the world price for rice at Egypt's border.

This price

is assumed to apply to both exports and imports so all relevant export and
import costs have been netted out.

The curve WXYZ in Figure 2 represents the

maximum marginal values of rice to the economy as a whole.

The segment WXY

suggests that quantities below point Y are more valuable when consumed
domestically, whereas quantities above point Y are more valuable to the
economy if exported and the foreign exchange is utilized to buy foreign goods
that are available to Egypt in international trade.
On the supply side, OQq is the quota of milled rice equivalent in paddy
imposed on rice producers and that is delivered to the government.
disposition of this quantity is assumed to be as follows:

The

OQr is the quantity

allocated by ration cards to rural consumers at price Pc, QrQc is the
quantity issued to urban consumers by ration cards, also at price Pc, QcQc'
is the quantity available to urban consumers at price Pc' and Qc' Oq is the
quantity exported at the world price Pw•
The government pays the producers Pp for quota rice.

As pointed out

above, production over the quota is consumed at home by rural consumers or is
traded in rural areas in a free market.

An extended analytical apparatus is

needed to represent the complexity of the rural market and indicate the
equilibrium of supply and demand.
In Figure 3, Dr' represents the demand for nonquota rice in rural areas.
It is derived by subtracting the rationed quantity in rural areas OQr from
rural demand Dr•

Dr' is composed of two parts:

the demand for home
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consumption of rice by the families growing it and the demand by others in the
free rural market.
The supply curve relevant to the rural market, St' in Figure 3, is the
total supply St less the quota Oq•

Given the derived demand and supply curves

Dr' and St' the equilibrium price in the free market is Pf and the equilibrium
quantity is Of•

If this quantity is added to the quota, the resulting

quantity is the total supply Qg+f in Figure 2.

An important assumption of

this analysis is that the supply price guiding production decisions at the
margin is the price in the free market, Pf, and not the quota price, Pp.

This

means that it is Pf that influences the area planted to rice, since the
farmers will compare the marginal profitability of growing various crops in
reaching a decision on acreage as well as the use of other productive inputs.
Obviously, the quota price affects the farmer's net income and the economic
rent available after the variable factors have been paid, but the significant
supply determinant is the free market price.
Let us now explore some of the welfare implications of these
institutional arrangements for pricing and allocating rice.

If demand curves

could be estimated econometrically, it would be possible to estimate the
consumer surplus captured by consumers because of the rationing and subsidy
policy.

Likewise, the net costs or benefits could be estimated from the

policy of exporting rice rather than consuming it domestically.
Unfortunately, the data are not available that permit such an estimate.
Also of interest is the question of what might occur if there were no
government intervention at all.

Suppose there were no fixed quotas and that

prices to producers were permitted to rise to world market levels.
be the economic efficiency implications?

What would

The quantity supplied would rise to
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OQe in Figure 2.

The quantity demanded domestically would be PwY and YQe

would be exported.
As indicated above, the world (export) price of rice represents the
opportunity cost to the economy as a whole of domestic consumption.

If the

free market price is below the world price because of barriers to export,
these barriers will create resource misallocation.

At the margin, additional

production will cost less than it is worth to the economy.

In Figure 4,

domestic production is at quantity Oq+f rather than Oe, the
efficiency-maximizing level of supply.

If production were at Oe, the quantity

above Oq+f would be worth more than it costs by the area
(l/2)(Pw - Pf)(Qe - Oq+f) or area ghi in Figure 4.
Of course, Oe cannot be observed since the world price is not the price
which rice farmers see as the return for their marginal output.

As argued

above, the effective marginal supply price for rice farmers is the free market
price Pf in Figure 4.
also observable.

This price is observable.

The total production Oq+f is

To estimate point Oe, the quantity that would be supplied at

the world price, Pw, the elasticity of supply is required.

Consider the

formula for arc elasticity:
Oe - Oq+f
e: =

Oe + Oq+f
Pw - pf
Pw + pf

Oe is the unknown to be solved for.

The estimates for area ghi, the welfare

efficiency loss on the supply side, for various elasticities of supply are
presented in Table 2.
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These supply-side welfare losses to the economy ranged from L.E. 370,200
at an assumed supply price elasticity of 0.10 to L.E. 2,913,100 at an
elasticity of 0.75.

It is significant to note that the loss is heavily

influenced by two factors:

1) the elasticity of supply, and 2) the difference

between the world price and the domestic marginal supply price.
As for point 2, it is apparent that if the free market price is close to
the world price, area ghi in Figure 4 will be small, unless the elasticity of
supply is very large.

Also, since the free market price is greater than the

quota price to producers, the argument that the free market price is the
relevant supply price means that estimated supply-side welfare losses are
smaller than would be the case if an average price received by producers were
used as the supply price.

The conclusion is that the existence of the free

market in rural areas reduces the welfare losses to the economy.

If the free

market were extended to the urban areas as well and if the free market price
approached the world price, there would not be supply-side welfare losses of
the kind analyzed here at all.
Let us now move to an assessment of the demand-side welfare costs of the
existing pricing and allocating policies for rice.

These costs will be

positive if the pricing policy leads Egyptian consumers to attach lower
marginal values to the consumption of rice than it is worth to the economy as
exports.
Consider Figure 4.

Dr and Du represent the demand curves for rice in

rural and urban areas, respectively.

In the rural areas, total consumption

consists of the quantity rationed to rural consumers (0 Or) plus the
difference between total production (0 Oq+f) and the delivered quota (0 Oq).
This difference is consumed at home or sold to other rural consumers in the
open market.

Analytically, what is required is a marginal valuation number

Table 2:

Assumed Price
Elasticity
of Supply

Supply-side Losses
Estimate of Equi.
Supply at World Price
(Qe)
( tons)

Social Efficiency Losses Due to Price and
Subsidy Policies for Rice in Egypt

Welfare Loss
(Area ghi of
Figure 3)

Assumed Price
Elasticity
of Demand

Demand-side Losses
Estimate of Equil.
Demand at World Price
(Qe)

Welfare Loss
(Area abc of
Figure 3)

Total
Rural and
Urban Loss

(tons)

L.E.

L.E.

L.E.

0.10

1,648,000

370,000

0.25

1,688,000

944,000

0.44

1,738,000

1,667,000

0.50

1,754,000

·. 1,900,000

0.75

1,825,000

2,913,000

- 0.12

urban

611,000

268,000

rural

1,423,000

625,000

urban

583,000

677,000

rural

1,357,000

1,577,000

urban

557,000

1,042,000

rural

1,265,000

2,903,000

893,000
- 0.31

2,254,000
- 0.59

3,945,000
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that will permit us to establish a point on the demand curve Dr at quantity
[OQr + (OQq+f -OQq)].
The open market price Pf seems to be the most suitable number.

Rural

families that produce and consume rice could be expected to apportion their
nonquota production between home consumption and sales to the open market such
that their values at the margin are equal to Pf•
lower if it is of inferior quality.

Rationed rice may be valued

But if it were indistinguishable from

nonrationed rice it might also be traded at the open market price by those who
valued it less.

Even though good evidence exists that rationed rice is indeed

of lower quality, it is not clear how much of a quality discount should be
applied.

It is, therefore, assumed that all rice consumed can be valued at

the open market price and the relevant point on the demand curve is point c in
Figure 4.

As will be seen later, the direction of the bias of this assumption

is to understate the magnitude of the welfare loss.
As argued earlier, the opportunity cost to the economy of domestic rice
/

consumption is the world price at Egypt's border, the foreign exchange
earnings from exports.
Figure 4.

Thus, at the margin the welfare loss is be in

The loss would be less on the inframarginal quantities.

the area of welfare loss is abc.

Given Dr,

To estimate the area in this triangle, point

a must be estimated - the quantity of rice that would be demanded in rural
r
areas at the world price (0 Qe in Figure 4). If point c, and the world
price are known, point a can be estimated by extending the demand curve Dr
back until it crosses the world price.

This can done if the average
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elasticity of demand is known over the arc ac.

~

The well-known formula is,

=
Pl - Po
Pl+ Po

ql

= OQr + (0 Qq+f - 0 Qq)

qo

= 0 qre

Pl

= pf

Po

= PW
r
We first solve for q 0 (OQe).

The next step is to estimate area abc.

Assuming the demand curve is linear, abc = (l/2)(po-P1)(q1-qo)•
Table 2 contains estimates of demand-side welfare losses for various
assumed elasticities of demand discussed previously.

In the rural areas they

range from L.E. 625,000 at an assumed elasticity of -0.12 to L.E. 2,903,000 at
an assumed elasticity of -0.59.
In estimating welfare losses in urban areas, the situation is more
problematical.

There is no free market to provide evidence on the marginal

valuations of rice.

It is known that rice sold at 14 p.t. per kilo is not

always available and that sales are often accompanied by customers waiting in
queues.

These facts suggest excess demand at the prevailing fixed price.

Even though somewhat arbitrary, the assumption is employed here that the free
market price in rural areas represents the marginal valuation for urban as
well as rural consumers.

If so, area def in Figure 4 will represent the

welfare loss to the economy due to the fact that the marginal valuation of
urban consumers of rice is below the world border price.

These losses are

measured in precisely the same way as described for rural areas.

They range
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from L.E. 268,000 at an assumed price elasticity of demand of -0.12 to
L.E. 1,042,000 at a price elasticity of -0.59 (Table 2).
It must be kept in mind that if the marginal valuation of urban and rural
consumers of rice has been overstated by using the free market price, the
welfare losses will have been understated.

We believe that this result is

quite possible and that our estimate of welfare losses are conservative.
Conclusions and Implications
In conclusion, if an intermediate price elasticity of supply (say 0.44)
is assumed, the supply-side welfare costs of current policies are
L.E. 1,667,000 annually.

On

the demand-side, if a price elasticity of -0.31

is assumed, the combined urban and rural welfare costs are L.E. 2,254,000.
The sum of supply-side and demand-side losses is L.E. 3,921,000 annually.
This is only about 10 p.t. per capita, not a large loss.
These results depend heavily on the free domestic market for rice that
provided our estimates of producer marginal returns and consumer marginal
valuations.

Both producers and rural consumers use the free market to

increase their well-being by trading in rice.
If there were no restrictions on rice exports, and if the open market for
rice were legalized, then the free price would equal the border price minus
the handling and transport costs involved in getting the exported rice into
the hands of foreign purchasers.

Of course, this would eliminate all of the

welfare cost of the type analyzed in this paper.

We fail to see any

compelling reason why this should not be permitted to happen.

The free

market should be encouraged in urban areas as well as in rural areas and this
will probably increase the free market price since urban consumers would have
a way of fulfilling their existing excess demand.
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Instead, there is discussion of eliminating rice exports althogether.
If, as a consequence, the domestic free price is held below the border export
price by export restrictions, misallocation will result as our analysis shows.
Then why should there be pressure for domestic consumption of all production?
Perhaps we need look no further than the perceived consumption "requirements"
of the growing Egyptian population.
It must be remembered, however, that domestic consumption is affected by
the management of the rationing and quota systems as well as by control of
exports.

Let us suppose, for example, that the allocation to domestic

consumption of rice were increased and covered by increasing the mandatory
quota delivered to the government by the producers.

This could be done by

providing more in the rationed entitlement or by supplying more to be sold at
the fixed 14 p.t. price where there is excess demand.
following effects:

This would have the

(1) Surplus captured by consumers would increase, the

amount depending on whether ultimately sold at the rationed price of 5 p.t. or
the nonrationed but still subsidized price of 14 p.t. per kilogram.

Under

current policies, the latter type of surplus would be captured by urban
consumers.

(2) Producers of rice

would probably lose since the quota price

is below the free market price and producers would have less to constnne at
home or sell in the free market.
rise or fall.

(3) The price in the free market may either

If the quota is increased, the supply curve in Figure 3 will

shift upward and to the left while the demand curve will shift downward and to
the left.

Whether the price falls or rises will depend on the elasticities of

these two curves.

In any case, both consumer and producer surplus will

decline in the rural areas.

It is clear that the total effect will shift real

income from the rural to the urban sector.
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An important caveat is that our results apply only to the pricing and
distribution policies for a given quantity of produced rice and do not imply
that no misallocation of resources exists because of other government policies
affecting rice production, such as fixed cropping patterns and control of
irrigation water.

A study of these issues is urgently needed.
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Footnotes
1The seven governorates were Alexandria, Behera, Kafer el Shaek, Garbia,
Dakahlia, Domiata, and Sharkia.
2The remainder of the governorates were Menofia, Kalubia, Giza,
Beni-Souef, and Minia.
3oariba equals 945 k.g.
4 No actual data of waste are available.

The Ministry of Agriculture uses

an arbitrary measure which is about 2 percent of the total milled rice.
5Approximately 60 k.g. of paddy rice or 41 k.g. of milled rice is used
for seeds per feddan.
6L.E. stands for Egyptian Pounds.
L.E •• 813 per U.S. dollar.

The current official exchange rate is

Presently a thriving black market for dollars

exists in Egypt with "street" values running generally from L.E. 1.1 to
L.E. 1.5 per dollar.
7 p.t. is the abbreviation for piasters.

One L.E. equals 100 piasters.

8 This value assumes a currency exchange rate of 70 p.t. per dollar.

In

reality, this estimate understates the value of exports since the parallel
exchange rate during the period was about 82 p.t. per dollar.

If the parallel

rate is used, the net value of exports would be L.E. 23.78 million.
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